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lent behaviors described as ‘new radicalisms’ in the context of the
Eurozone economic crisis. The authors make a conceptual and em -
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tinomial logit models test the role of core values that map on the
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Introduction
In this article we examine the psychological drivers of anomic,
extreme and violent political preferences and actions occurring
in the context of the Eurozone economic crisis. Behaviors descri -
bed as ‘subterranean politics’ (Kaldor & Selchow 2012) or the
‘new wave of political radicalism’ (Taheri 2015) are widespread
across Europe. Opposition against political violence is not as ex-
plicit as once was, and ‘radical’ populist political parties have
seen their fortunes rise in elections and polls.1 Grassroots mo -
vements such as the ‘indignados’ in Spain and its equivalent,
the ‘aganaktismenoi’, in Greece were agents of social resistance
empowering individuals.2 As these phenomena express indivi -
duals’ desire for political change, they are often labeled ‘radical’
but their psychological nature is rarely explored. Using core per -
sonal values as the underlying determinants of political preferences
we make a conceptual and empirical distinction between orien-
tations that are radical, defined by a clear desire to oppose the old
and implement change, and orientations that are reactionist, de -
fined by a clear desire to preserve tradition and return to the past.3
Our research was motivated by the observation that this com -
bustive potential often called ‘new radicalisms’ is present among
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1. For example, see UKIP in the UK, Marine Lepen’s National Front
party in France, the Dutch Freedom party of Geert Wilders in the Nether-
lands, the nationalist extreme right Golden Dawn and the left-wing radical
SYRIZA in Greece, the nationalist Jobbik party in Hungary, the Austrian
Freedom party. 
2. Specifically in the case of Greece extreme right and extreme left ideo -
logical populist elements were present in the ‘aganaktismenoi’ movement,
and their legacy sparked more violent expressions of political discontent
(Simiti 2014).
3. Reactionism should not be confused with ‘réactionnisme’ or ‘néo-
réactionnisme’, terms used in early 21st century in France to describe cen-
tre-right leaning journalists and intellectuals who expressed conservative
ideas on policy, polity, and the culture without endorsing economic neolibe -
ral precepts (Boltanski & Esquerre 2014).
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those who occupy the political fringes of the extreme right or
left as well as disinterested citizens and those engaging with main -
stream politics. As such, it appears to break the moulds of left-ri -
ght ideological attachments. In addition, it is expressed in various
forms and through multiple channels: lawful demonstrations, stri -
kes and protest; active disengagement from democratic processes;
abstention from vote; hostility towards international and natio -
nal institutions, political and socio-economic elites; support of
or engagement with anomic, extreme and violent political actions.
The above are seen as a direct result of disappointment with how
the political system is practiced, combined with objective and
perceived financial hardships, deprivation and social injustice,
and the negative emotional energy generated by the economic
crisis (Chaulia 2014; Schäfer & Streeck 2013).
Our thesis is that this recent wave of orientations and be-
haviors labeled ‘new radicalisms’ does not fit the traditional de-
finition of right and left radicalisms. The traditional radical left
follows the anti-liberal but not anti-democratic tradition and re-
jects the underlying socio-economic structure of modern-day ca -
pitalism.4 The traditional radical right averts representative
democracy and just like the radical left it does not present itself
as anti-democratic, but as bearing true democracy for the na-
tives (Rydgren 2007).5 These typologies make a dual assumption:
that the break with the status quo rests on two distinct ideo lo -
gies (left vs. right) and different directions for change (forward
vs. backward). The radicalisms of the left are driven by desire
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4. By identifying economic inequality as the base and source of liberal
democracy and capitalist economy, radical left parties and ideologists reject
capitalist values and practices with the ultimate purpose of establishing anew
an economic and governing system based on collective economic and social
rights and extreme redistribution from existing elites (March & Mudde 2005).
5. Radical right rejects pluralism and thus liberal democracy (Minken-
berg 2000). Their ideological core is based on sociocultural authoritarianism
and nativism (Rydgren 2005). This ideology also rejects division lines within
‘the people’ accepting only those between ‘the people’ and the elites behaving
exactly as antiestablishment populism.
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for change against the old, in this case the existing capitalist sys-
tem, while radicalisms of the right are associated with a desire
to recover and reinstate the past and move towards a more autho -
ritarian or paternalistic state. A careful look into the ‘new radi-
calisms’ shows that they sit neither on the left, nor on the right,
but rather span across both. In addition, the direction of their
desire for change, forward for the left and backward for the
right, is assumed and not examined by extant research. 
We bracket ideological qualifiers of ‘left’ and ‘right’ and under -
stand the new ‘radicalisms’ on the basis of their desire for chan -
ge. We employ the original conception of ‘radical’ which pointed
to innovation. Wolfe (1923) defined radicalism as the desire for,
and the advocacy of, speedy, deep and thoroughgoing innova-
tive reform or revolution, either touching only certain aspects of
social relations and processes, or involving the entire social or-
der.6 This original conception of radicalism as desire and advo-
cacy for change against the old, towards the new is often labe -
led ‘left radicalism’, distinguishing it from ‘right radicalism’
which seeks change against the old and has right-leaning ideo-
logical preferences. What type of change are these ‘new radica -
lisms’ of the financial crisis advocating? Using core personal va -
lues as empirical instruments we examine whether recent ‘radi-
cal’ political engagement in the context of the financial crisis
points to desire for change against the old, confirming its radi-
cal label, or shows desire for change backwards, against the new,
which would be consistent with reactionism. 
We test this theoretical framework in an environment with
increased protest activities including the full spectrum of legal,
anomic, extreme and violent political acts: Greece in the height
of the financial crisis. Greece experienced intense and often vio -
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6. Craig Calhoun (1987) defines radicalism as a political orientation
towar ds basic or extreme challenges to established order. As a relational
term, ‘radicalism’ has been defined also as a view that existing arrange-
ments should be transformed on the basis of foundations, roots, which are
either to be rediscovered and re-asserted, or to be transplanted from the ideal
to the actual (Barker 2001).
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 04:48:45 |
lent political behaviors due to the severe economic hardship and
the migration challenges. These behaviors have been observed
in both sides of the political spectrum, where individuals and
political entities on the left and on the right engaged or silently
supported such actions. Understanding their origins as radical
or reactionist and their relation to left or right-wing ideology
can shed light to how they can be best addressed. 
Our key contribution is two-fold: we identify radicalism and
reactionism on the basis of distinct sets of core personal values;
and we empirically examine the role of values as predictors of
support and active engagement in anomic, extreme and violent
political acts. We start with a theoretical discussion and concep-
tual definition of radicalism, reactionism and related concepts,
we highlight the role of core values in determining radical and
reactionist politics, and lay out our hypotheses about the nature
of passive and active political engagement. Our methodology se -
ction outlines the data procedures, variable operationalizations,
and empirical models we employ to test our hypotheses, drawn
from a dedicated survey of political radicalism in Greece during
the financial crisis. Our analysis highlights significant differen -
ces in the ways radical and reactionist values explain legal, ille-
gal and violent political behaviors and their passive support. We
control for the effects of mitigating factors like emotionality, ef-
ficacy, institutional trust and basic demographics. In our conclu -
sion we outline the significance of our findings in understanding
and predicting political behavior in times of crisis, and the im-
plications for understanding the psychology of engagement with
reactionist or radical politics. 
On radicalism, traditional definitions 
and a new typology
To best explain ‘new radicalisms’ in the context of the financial
crisis, we take a brief look at the conceptualization of radicalism.
It is a recurring political orientation which does not occupy a
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particular left or right ideological space. In fact, it could point
to both directions; consider for example socialism, anarchism,
or bolshevism. These radicalisms, as well as other kinds of radi-
calism such as anticlericalism (Schmid 2013), denote the desire
for urgent change breaking with the old and uprooting towards
the new using even violent or illegal means.7 This stated desire
for, and the advocacy of, change towards the new is speedy and
deep and engages an individual’s beliefs, feelings, and behaviors
(Wolfe 1923). Radicalism as a political orientation is therefore
tripartite: it requires desire for change against the status quo,
the direction of change is towards the new against the old and it
has complex psychological properties that may or may not lead to
action. This definition can help us avoid a common pitfall among
empirical studies which assume that left radicalism promotes
change forward, against the old, and right radicalism promotes
change backward, against the new, or definitions that solely rely
on behavioral indicators to identify radicalism. To identify more
clearly its conceptual borders it is useful to consider radicalism
alongside related social phenomena that can share the desire for
change and thoroughness and potentially generate legal, illegal
and sometimes violent behaviors, like reactionism, activism, ter -
rorism, extremism, conservatism and fundamentalism. 
An orientation that sits conceptually very close to radicalism
but has hardly received attention is reactionism. It engages in
undistinguishable behaviors from radicalism, and it idealizes and
advocates change, but it does it in the diametrically opposite dire -
ction: reactionism is change in reverse, opposing the new, in con -
trast with forward-looking radicalism that desires change opposing
T. CAPELOS Ξ A. KATSANIDOU Ξ N. DEMERTZIS40
7. Radicalism advocates change which can, but does not have to involve
violent actions: there are gradations of e expressed violence of radicalism.
Veldhuis & Staun (2009) make a distinction between violent radicalism, with
emphasis on the active pursuit or acceptance of the use of violence to attain
the stated goal, and a broader sense of radicalism with emphasis on the active
pursuit or acceptance of far-reaching changes in society which may or may
not constitute a danger to democracy and may or may not involve the threat
of or use of violence to attain the stated goals.
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the old, cutting the roots. In a somewhat militant and nostalgic
fashion, reactionists return to some previously existing –but now
abandoned– model of social and political order. They strive to
go back to the tried and the familiar, rather than seek the deep
reforms and speedy changes advocated by the radicals. While
the key word for radicalism is innovation, the key word for rea -
ctionism is renovation. Both radical and reactionist aims would
upset the goals and visions of conservatives who would prefer
things to stay-as-they-are and want no change. 
Activism, like radicalism and reactionism, is also marked by
the desire for change but its direction is not always specified. It
signifies engagement with political action that is legal, in con-
trast to radicalism and reactionism that can involve engagement
with illegal or violent political action. Moskalekno & McCauley
(2009) argue that radicalism is an extreme form of activism that
uses violent and illegal means for change. We argue that the
essence of radical and reactionist political action lies in its de-
sire for swift change while activism, which is a political style pro -
moting action, does not necessarily desire swift change. The dif-
ferentiation rests on the element of change or uprooting, rather
than the nature (legal or illegal or violent) of the intended or actua -
lized behavior. 
Extremism is also conceptually close since radicalism and
reactionism can contain attitudes and behaviors that favor ex-
treme solutions to perceived problems. Kedem, Bilu, & Cohen
(1987) borrow a definition of radical behavior from Stein and
Urdang (1971) as ‘…one who follows extreme principles. One who
advocates fundamental and drastic political reforms or changes
by direct and uncompromising methods [...] It denotes that
which goes beyond moderation or even to excess in opinion, be-
lief, action, etc’. Schoenberger (1968: 871) conceptualizes extre -
mism as willing to effectuate political changes through techniques
of personal and group harassment, slanderous or libelous alle-
gations and put forward or support wild and probably unattaina -
ble policy objectives. We place the distinction between these con -
cepts not just on the extremity of behaviors, but also on the clear
41BACK TO BLACK
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desire for swift change (against the old or new). Often extremi -
sms do not favor change forward or backward, and radicalisms
and reactionsisms can involve other means than extreme political
action. The borders of the concepts are fuzzy and might overlap
particularly when the actions are extreme and the desire for swift
change is the driver of behavior. Yet, they can be clearly demar -
cated to the extent that extremism is by definition anti-democ-
ratic as it prefers (a) force/violence over persuasion; (b) unifor-
mity over diversity; (c) collective goals over individual freedoms
and (d) giving orders over seeking dialogue (Schmid 2013: 54). 
Terrorism and radicalism are often talked about as if they
are the same phenomenon, since terrorism is a form of action
which adopts the use of illegal force, threat, and unexpected and
shocking violence to promote political motives by intimidating
or coercing governments or civilians (Loza 2007). McCauley and
Moskalenko (2008) looked at the mechanisms of political radi-
calization that are related to terrorism. They conceptualize ter-
rorism as an extreme form of radicalization that emerges from
the intergroup dynamics of conflict. While we agree with the abo -
ve, we find it useful to separate conceptually the two. Radical is an
act or intention that looks forward for swift change, and does not
necessarily aim to intimidate by the use of force and violence. 
Fundamentalism, often associated with religious movements,
shares with radicalism the desire for change, and is similar to
reactionismin terms of the direction of its desire to return back
to a previous ideal. But fundamentalism holds particular chara -
cteristics that are not shared by radicalism or reactionism. It in-
dicates attachment to irreducible ‘fundamental’ and pure be-
liefs, is marked by a literalist interpretation of its principles
simi lar to Dogmatism, and adopts strong in-group out-group di -
stin ctions. In addition, fundamentalism is not associated with
particular action preferences, and can remain an ideological exer -
cise (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; Nagata 2001). 
To recap, radicalism is a complex system of  sentiments, men-
tal attitudes and behaviors that denote a swift and urgent desire
for change against the old. Its sister term, reactionism is more
T. CAPELOS Ξ A. KATSANIDOU Ξ N. DEMERTZIS42
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appropriate for labeling desire for change backward, against the
new. This definition of radicalism and reactionism free them from
delineated ideological attachments, which compromise the un-
derstanding of recent expressions of radical political preferen -
ces and actions. Political radicalism, despite having been studied
extensively, does not hold a uniform conceptualization, and rea -
ctionism has been largely neglected as a concept. In addition,
although radicalism as an orientation involves change-promot-
ing values, attitudes, emotions, preferences and organized poli -
tical action, its empirical measurement is often restricted to be-
havioral indicators of illegal and violent, and sometimes legal
political actions. 
We argue that to understand the essence of radical and rea -
ctionist political engagement, we need to focus a) on the core
values that drive the desire for urgent change against the old or
against the new, and b) adopt a two-step approach that distin-
guishes intended from actualized behavior. Such empirical mea -
sures of radical political engagement will have construct validity
and not rely merely on behavioral indicators. Our two-step ap-
proach distinguishes between passive support that remains dor-
mant (i.e. accepting radical or reactionist behavior but not enga -
ging in it) and actualized behavior. In this way, we acknowled ge
the breadth and spread of these phenomena, and avoid inac -
curate empirical conclusions. 
Desire for change: looking forward or looking back
Values are instrumental for the understanding of the underlying
causal structure of radicalism and reactionism. They are enduring
beliefs, connected to desirable goals and modes of conduct, which
serve as standards and guide behavior and action (Rokeach
1973; Schwartz 1992; Glynn et al. 2004). Values exist in clusters,
can be prioritized, and although they can change slowly over
time, they provide the stable basis for behaviours, attitudes, po-
litical preferences and ideology, transcending particular situations
43BACK TO BLACK
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(Feldman 1988; Goren, Schoen, Reifler, Scotto & Chittick 2016;
Kinder & Sanders 1996; Miller & Shanks 1996; Zaller 1992; Pef-
fley & Hurwitz 1985; Schwartz 1992, 1996). 
According to Schwartz (1994), a small number of core per-
sonal values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-
di rection, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, secu -
rity) span across the dimensions of openness versus conserva-
tion and self-transcendence versus self-enhancement.8 These
ca tegories are abstract and fundamental, and serve as guiding
principles in individuals’ lives, from decision-making to attitu-
dinal responses (Goren et al. 2016; Chrona & Capelos 2016).9
A number of studies focus also on political values reflecting nor -
mative beliefs or ideals about political matters that serve to con-
solidate attitudes and determine behaviour in the political sphe -
re. Such overarching political values are related to freedom and
civil liberties, egalitarianism and equality, ethnocentrism, limited
government, economic security, law and order and moral tradi-
tionalism (Goren 2005; Hurwitz & Peffley 1987; McCann 1997;
Schwartz et al. 2010; McClosky & Zaller 1984; Huddy, Feldman,
Taber & Lahav 2005). Analyses of political values in political psy -
chology, public opinion and electoral behavior provide sound
explanations of citizen’s individual preferencesfor particular po -
licies like government spending (Jacoby 2006), abortion (Alvarez
& Brehm 1995), campaign finance reform (Grant & Rudolf 2003),
social welfare (Feldman & Zaller 1992) but also broader societal
trends regarding political culture (Inglehart 1997; Abramson &
Iglehart 1995), political attitudes towards liberty (Davis 2007),
or the welfare state (McClosky & Zaller 1984).
Core personal values and political values are related – the
core personal values provide internal constraint and are expres sed
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8. The Schwartz ‘core’ values are similar to the Rokeach ‘terminal’ vis-à-
vis ‘instrumental’ values. Terminal values are non-reducible normative sti -
pulations guiding personalities and the organizational principles of any given
society. Instrumental values are means for the realization of the terminal ones. 
9. This theory has been tested across 70 countries and using a variety
of instruments, and results support this categorization (Bilsky et al. 2011). 
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via political values which in turn influence political choices (Feld -
man 1988). While political values are limited in the political sphe -
re, core personal values operate in all domains of life, for exam-
ple consumer decisions, sports, music and vocational inte rests,
to name a few (Ciuk & Jacoby 2015). For the average citizens, for
whom political values are not salient determinants of how they
perceive and act on the political world, core personal values are
relevant predictors of their political intentions and behaviors.
Here, we are interested in conceptualizing the core value struc-
ture that promotes radical versus reactionist political orienta-
tions, and examine how they are manifested in specific political
preferences and behaviors. 
In western democracies radicalism has been presented as
conceptually related to freedom and change, and as the ideologi -
cal opposite of conservativism which supports the status quo and
opposes change (Hirsh et al. 2010). Because radical politics show
a desire for the new, we expect radicalism to draw on values that
highlight preference for new experiences, independence and no -
velty. The Schwartz (1994) value dimensions of self-direction,
adventurousness, and stimulation, identified by items that mea-
sure being interested in new ideas, taking risks and being ad-
venturous are a close conceptual fit. Reactionism and its desire
to return to the way things were, is best represented with value
preferences that preserve tradition and conserve the old family
and religious norms. 
In the case of Greece, we expect specific value patterns to
arise out of the context of the financial crisis. People in econo -
mic hardship attribute higher importance to the attainment of
wealth (Inglehart 1991; Schwarz 1994). We therefore expect ma -
terialist values to be salient. In addition, extreme conditions of
economic deprivation increase the force of ‘deficit needs’ (Ma -
slow 1959). In times of crisis citizens find themselves under sig-
nificant amounts of stress, experience high levels of insecurity,
and show a ‘need for rigid, predictable rules’ in their search for
stability (Inglehart 1990: 177). In situations where people lose a
long-term feeling of security, they lose the psychological base
45BACK TO BLACK
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that allows them to accept deviation from familiar patterns. They
return to feeling anxiety about their basic existential needs and
activate their survival mode. Safety and danger avoidance, con-
formity, materialism, become significant considerations of indi-
viduals and societies in crisis. Along these lines, we expect that
the recent wave of approval or active engagement in legal, illegal
and violent behaviors will be accompanied by values that favor
conversation and a preference for the familiar (reactionism)
rather than values that promote new experiences (radicalism).
Two points are important here. First, we see values as key
indicators of radical and reactionist orientations. Extreme or vio -
lent behaviors, often used as measures of radicalism, can surely
be an expression of radical or reactionist politics, but they can
also be an expression of neither. In the absence of value orien-
tations, we are left with violence and extremism of the non-radi -
cal, non-reactionist kind.10 Second, we do not preclude that radi -
cal politics cannot be inspired in the context of economic hard-
ship. The inertia of traditional risk-averse politics is powerful
but so can be the desire for change against the old. However, as
we will show, during the Greek financial crisis, radical politics
were not the dominant explanation of behaviors that were at
first instance deemed to be perceived and labeled as radical. In-
stead, legal, illegal and violent behaviors were mostly driven by
traditional preferences and return to conformist ideals, which
point to reactionist orientations. 
Methodology 
We test our hypothesis about the reactionist nature of political
behaviors in Greece using data from a representative survey of
Greek population conducted by the University of Macedonia,
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10. To be sure, political violence is not restricted to extremism or non-
state and state terrorism; examples of non extremist and non terrorist political
violence is tyrannicide, torture, partisan warfare, sabotage, ethnic cleansing,
etc., some of which are justified by international law (Schmid 2013: 13-14).
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designed to measure and understand radical political engage-
ment and behavior. The Project ‘Designing & Operating an In-
frastructure for the Empirical Inquiry of Political & Social Radi -
calism in Greece’ was funded by the EU Commission and the
Greek Ministry of Education (Konstantinidis et al. 2015). Field-
work took place in January 14 -17, 2015. The survey had 758 re-
spondents and a total of 69 questions. Among these, 10 items
measured core personal values, and 19 assessed intention or ac-
tive engagement in illegal or violent political action often asso-
ciated with radical politics, and legal non-violent action associa -
ted with ordinary political participation. The items measuring
engagement with illegal and violent behavior distinguish this
specialized survey from other more general public opinion sur-
veys (e.g. The European Social Survey) and provide us with the
opportunity to get closer to the combustive character of radical
and reactionist politics. 
Core personalvalues were measured by ten short verbal por-
traits of people pointing to specific values and asking how simi-
lar these portraits were to each participant: importance of having
new ideas and be creative in own way (creativity), being rich and
having expensive possessions (materialism), being successful
and recognized by others (achievement), respecting rules and avoi -
ding to act in ways others consider wrong (conformity), respect
tradition, family and religion (tradition), living in a safe envi-
ronment and avoid danger (security), enjoying life and having a
good time (hedonism), caring for others and looking out for
their best interest (benevolence), being adventurous and taking
risks (stimulation), and caring for nature and the environment
(universalism).
Factor analysis identified three qualitatively different value
clusters. The first pointed to desire for conservation, the second
pointed to desire for new experiences, and the third pointed to
individual well-being considerations (Table 1). Desire for con-
servation explains 22% of the variance and focuses on values such
as respect for tradition, conformity and desire for security. Indi -
vidual well-being explains 16% of the variance tapping on power,
47BACK TO BLACK
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achievement, and hedonism. About 13% of the variance is ex-
plained by the desire for new experiences which contains stimu -
lation, self-direction, benevolence and universalism.
Table 1: Results of the Principal Component Analysis 
N o t e: Data from Konstantinides et al. (2015)
The political behavior measures range from risky illegal but
physically non-violent actions, like participating in illegal demon -
strations, occupying buildings, obstructing public transportation
or public works, objecting to pay ticket for public transport,
demonstrating while concealing own identity, writing on walls,
aganaktismenoi (indiganti), to illegal violent actions such as de-
stroying private property, attacking a political actor, burning the
national flag, destroying religious symbols, taking law and order
into one’s own hands, carrying dangerous items in demonstra-
tions with intent to hurt others, and also mainstream legal ac-
tions (membership of political party or non-party organization,
participating in demonstrations regarding workers’ rights, social,
national or religious issues). Each item is measured on a 5-point
Likert with 0 ‘would never engage’, to 5 for ‘have engaged/would
engage’. Figure 1 below provides a graphical presentation on the
legal/illegal and violent/non-violent action indicators.
Eigen values Variance explained
Desire for conservation 2.148 21.5%
Individual well-being 1.609 16.1%
Desire for new experiences 1.269 12.7%
T. CAPELOS Ξ A. KATSANIDOU Ξ N. DEMERTZIS48
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Figure 1: Political Action Items 
We first test the assumption of traditional radicalism models
that desire for conservation would be associated with right wing
ideological preferences (right radicalism) and desire for new ex-
periences would be associated with left wing ideological preferen -
ces (left radicalism). We then test our model of values as predic-
tors of political action (illegal, violent and mainstream legal),
making a distinction between passive support that signifies in-
tention, and the actualized behavior indicators. We control for
ideology emotions, internal and external political efficacy (Craig,
Niemi & Silver 1990), trust towards institutions and citizens, po-
litical orientations, and demographics.
49BACK TO BLACK
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Analysis and findings 
The correlation of core values with left-right ideology scores shows
that desire for conservation is significantly and negatively cor-
related with ideological self-placement (–.175, p<.05) indicating
that high scores of this factor map on the left of the ideological
spectrum. Desire for new experiences is significantly positively
correlated with ideology (.106) indicating that high scores of this
factor are linked with right-wing ideology. Apparently, the tra-
ditional assessments of the left as forward looking and the right
as traditionalist are not supported here. This gives credit to our
argument that we ought to untangle ideology and radical poli-
tics if we want to understand both clearly. Keeping the financial
crisis environment in mind, we also correlated ideology with con -
siderations of individual well-being. We did not find a statisti-
cally significant correlation, meaning that well-being preferences
span across the ideological spectrum. 
Next, we compared the average scores on desire for conver-
sation and desire for new experiences among three groups of pa -
rticipants: those who opposed specific political actions, (illegal,
violent, or mainstream legal), those who supported but had not
engaged in them, and those who have engaged in such actions
in the past. We also accounted for individual well-being scores
to capture the impact of the financial crisis on political develop-
ments. Table 2 summarizes the statistically significant differen -
ces in mean values scores.11
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Table 2: Summary of Mean Comparisons 
for Average Value Scores between Stages of Support of Action 
(Opposition, Passive support, Action) 
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ILLEGAL 
NON-VIOLENT 
ACTIONS 
Desire 
for conservation
Individual 
well-being
Desire 
for new 
experiences
Illegal
Demonstrations
(Oppose, n=501)
Higher for Action
(n=120) and Passive
(n=111)
Higher 
for Action
(n=120)
Lower 
for Action
(n=120)
Occupation of
building (Oppose,
n=559)
Higher for Action
(n=101) and
Passive (n=72)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Obstruction of
public transportation
(Oppose, n=571)
Higher for Action
(n=96) and Passive
(n=64)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Obstruction 
of public works
(Oppose, n=562)
Higher for Action
(n=45) and Passive
(n=124)
No significant
differences
Lower 
for Action
(n=45)
Refusing to pay
ticket - bus, train
(Oppose, n=620)
Higher for Action
(n=50) and Passive
(n=51)
Lower 
for Action
(n=50)
No significant
differences
Indignanti (Oppose,
n=129)
Higher for Action
(n=128) and Passive
(n=394)
Higher 
for Action
(n=128) 
and Passive
(n=394)
No significant
differences
Demonstrate with
concealing face
(Oppose, n= 642)
Higher for Action
(n=5) and Passive
(n=25)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Graffiti (Oppose,
n=557)
Higher for Action
(n=13) and Passive
(n=87)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
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VIOLENT 
ILLEGAL ACTIONS
Desire 
for conservation
Individual
well-being
Desire 
for new
experiences
Destroy public
property (Oppose,
n=715)
Higher for Passive
(n=3)
Higher for
Passive (n=3)
No significant
differences
Attack political actor
(Oppose, n= 574)
Higher for Passive
(n=102)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Flag burning
(Oppose, N=701)
Higher for Action
(n=3) and Passive (10)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Destroy religious
symbols (Oppose,
n= 704)
Higher for Action
(n=10) and Passive
(n=34)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Carry objects 
to hurt others
(Oppose, n= 711)
Higher for Action
(n=5) and Passive (6)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
LEGAL ACTIONS
Desire 
for conservation
Individual
well-being
Desire 
for new
experiences
Membership
political party
(Oppose, n= 442)
No significant
differences
No significant
differences
Lower 
for Action
(n=234)
Political Membership
-non-party (Oppose,
n= 310)
Higher for Passive
(n=190) and Action
(n=233)
No significant
differences
Lower 
for Action
(n=233)
Demonstration
workers’ rights
(Oppose, n=173)
Higher for Action
(n=431)
Higher 
for Action
(n=431)
Lower 
for Action
(n=431)
Demonstration
social issues
(Oppose, n=212)
Higher for action
(n=318)
Lower 
for Passive
(n=203)
Lower 
for Action
(n=318)
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N o t e: Analysis shows mean comparisons, reported are statistically significant
means at p<.05. Number of respondents (n) per item in parenthesis. Opposition
indicates the response ‘I oppose and would not do it’, passive indicates the response
‘I support but have not done it’, and action indicates ‘I have done it’. Data from
Konstantinides et al. (2015). Detailed results available in Appendix b, Table 2b.
There are three noteworthy patterns. First, we see signifi-
cant differences in the scores of desire for conservation more so
than the other value clusters. Of the 19 action items, we noticed
significant differences on desire for conservation in about 17
items compared to significant differences on individual well-being
and desire for new experiences, with 7 items each. Second, dif-
ferences on levels of desire for conservation are prevalent across
the board, and particularly for illegal and violent actions, while
differences in the scores on individual well-being and desire for
new experiences are significantly different mainly for mainstream
legal actions. Third, for illegal actions, the transitional tipping
point between opposing them and supporting them is not be-
tween non-action and action but between opposition and holding
a favorable perspective. Passive supporters and those who have
engaged in the acts score similarly on desire for conservation.
Also those who passively condone violent acts score higher on de -
sire for conservation than those who have engaged in these ac-
tions. Had we not examined passive support indicators we would
have missed this combustive potential.
The above confirm that behaviors hastily labeled as radical
are associated with stronger desire for conservation, and there-
fore point to the reactionist nature of political engagement. This
interesting twist drives home our main message: to do justice to
the complex phenomenon of radicalism, we need to map empi -
ri cally he direction of the desire for change. Measures of core
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Demonstration
national and
religious issues
(Oppose, n=325)
Lower for Action
(n=202)
Lower 
for Passive
(n=205)
Higher 
for Passive
(n=205)
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personal values, such as desire for conservation or new experien -
ces provide good approximations of citizens’ orientations and
should be combined with measures of behaviors and intentions
to capture the essence of radical or reactionist engagement. 
The engagement with non-conventional political means ap-
pears to be reactionist. It is stimulated by the desire to restore
practices of the past rather than adventurousness and desire for
new ideas. We saw earlier that traditional left wing ideological
preferences also map on the desire for conservation. Our next
challenge is to investigate the drivers of this reactionist poten-
tial in a complex model that accounts for ideological attachments,
emotionality, political engagement and demographic controls,
and identify the important factors that affect the tipping points
of engagement with politics of the reactionist kind.
We ran multinomial logit regressions to measure change from
opposition (baseline category) to passive support (option-1) or
action (option-2) for each of the 19 behavior items. We expect
political engagement to be backward looking (reactionist), and
desire for conservation to predictactive and passive engagement
invarious types of action. The analyses include desire for conser -
vation and desire for new experiences as explanatory variables,
with ‘individual well-being’ scores as baseline to capture material
constraints generated by the financial crisis environment. 
In order to provide a parsimonious and valid model of em-
pirical relationships, we add predictors such as ideological orien -
tation on a left/right scale; ideological extremity (folded variable
with high values for extreme left or extreme right preferences
and low values for moderate preferences); internal and external
efficacy; social trust/confidence to political institutions (parlia-
ment, police, parties and justice system); emotions (anger and
hope, keeping fear as the baseline); and demographics like age,
education, and residence status (living in the capital, Athens or
living elsewhere). Table 3 provides a summary of the results pre -
sented in illegal, violent, and mainstream legal item sets.12
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Table 3: Summary of multinomial logit results
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Values
Type
Emo-
tions
Ideo-
logy
Confi-
dence
Efficacy
Illegal
Demon-
strations
Action Desire of
conserva-
tion (+)
Left (+) Police (-) Internal (+)
Passive
support
Left (+) Internal (+)
External (–)
Occupy
Buildings
Action Left (+) Parlia -
me nt (+) 
Police (–)
Passive
support
Parlia -
me nt (+)
Obstruct
public
works
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Left (–) Police (–)
Passive
support
Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Police (–) External (–)
Refuse 
to pay 
transport
ticket
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Police (–)
Justice
(+)
Passive
support
Left (–) Police (–)
Graffiti
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Passive
support
Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Police (–)
Indignadi
Action Left (–) Police (–) External (–)
Passive
support
External (–)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 04:48:46 |
T. CAPELOS Ξ A. KATSANIDOU Ξ N. DEMERTZIS56
Values
Type
Emo-
tions
Ideo-
logy
Confi-
dence
Efficacy
Obstruct
Traffic for
political
reasons
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Anger
(+)
Left (–) Police (–) Internal (+)
External (+)
Passive
support
Parlia -
me nt (+)
Attack 
Political 
Actor
Action Police (–)
Passive
support
Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Justice 
(–)
Destroy
religious
symbols
Action 
Passive
support
Self-apply
law order
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Passive
support
Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Carry 
obje cts 
to hurt 
others
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Passive
support
Police (–)
Political
party
member
Action Anger
(+)
Left (+) Parlia -
me nt (+) 
Police (–)
External (+)
Passive
support
Hope 
(–)
Justice 
(–)
Member of
non-party
organiza-
tion
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Hope 
(–)
Parlia -
me nt (+)
Police (–)
Internal (+)
Passive
support
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N o t e: Data from Konstantinides et al. (2015). Detailed results available in Ap-
pendix B, Table 3b.
As we expected, desire for conservation is overwhelmingly
relevant when predicting action and passive support, for six ille -
gal, three violent, and two mainstream legal engagement items.
Higher scores in this value system which promotes respect for
tradition and security explain action in nine items and passive
support in five items. Desire for new experiences has limited ex-
planatory power (significant only for one item). 
Looking first at illegal actions and moving from non-en-
gagement to action, desire for conservation is significant for
participation in illegal demonstrations, obstruction of traffic for
political reasons, obstruction of public works, refusing to pay
57BACK TO BLACK
Values
Type
Emo-
tions
Ideo-
logy
Confi-
dence
Efficacy
Demon -
stra tion
worke rs’
rights
Action Left (+) Police (–)
Passive
support
Political
Parties
(+)
Demon -
stra tion 
so cial 
issues
Action Desire 
of conser -
vation (+)
Desire
for new
experien -
 ces (–)
Left (–) Police (–)
Passive
support
Left (-) Police (–)
Justice
(+)
Demo na-
tional and
religious
issues 
Action Anger
(+)
Right
(+)
External (–)
Passive
support
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transport tickets, drawing of graffiti. Similarly, moving from non-
en gagement to passive support, the desire for conservation is signi -
ficant for occupying buildings, obstructing public works, and dra -
wing graffiti. Again, desire for new experiences is not a signifi-
cant factor in any of the analyses. These results provide empi rical
evidence that engaging in a number of political ‘radical’ actions
in Greece during the financial crisis is reactionist. Ideology is a
significant predictor for all illegal actions, and consistently in
the negative, showing higher probability of action or dormant
support, for left-leaning individuals. Ideology predicts transitions
from opposition to action for illegal demonstrations, occupying
buildings, obstructing traffic and public works, participating in
the indignandi mobilizations; it also predicts transition from
opposition to passive support of illegal demonstrations, refusing
to pay transport tickets, and graffiti.
Ideological extremity, often associated with engagement in
radical acts is only relevant for moving from opposing to ob-
structing traffic, painting graffiti, and passively supporting the
indingnadi. Social trust is relevant only for moving from opposing
to obstructing public works, while lack of confidence in the po-
lice has a booster effect for all illegal actions, particularly moving
from opposing to action. Internal political efficacy increases the
likelihood of participating in illegal demonstrations and traffic
obstruction and passive support of building occupations. The
effect of external political efficacy is more varied. It positively
influences the probability of participation in traffic obstruction
but has a negative influence for the probability to participate in
or show passive support for illegal demonstrations, obstructing
traffic and public works, and participating in the indignadi mo -
vement. We also find interesting age differentiations. Younger
individuals are more likely to participate in building occupa-
tions, actively or passively refuse to pay their transport tickets, do
or support graffiti, take part or passively support the indignadi,
while old age serves as a stimulant of participating in illegal de -
monstrations. Anger increases the probability of obstructing traf-
fic for political reasons, being male is significant in doing graffiti,
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and education does not have a significant independent effect on
illegal non-violent actions. 
Turning to violent activities, our findings again confirm our
expectation of the reactionist nature of engagement. We start
with the caution that positive responses here are few. This is
not surprising given the violent character of the acts. When par-
ticipants reported passive support or action, desire for conserva -
tion is a significant predictor. The probability of self-applying law
and order, and carrying objects to hurt others increases with de-
sire for conservation. We also find that passive support for atta -
cking a political actor and self-applying law and order increase
with desire for conservation. Ideology significantly increases the
probability of carrying objects to hurt others, with a positive ef-
fect pointing to right-wing attachments. In addition, being ideo-
logically extreme influences the passive willingness to destroy re -
ligious symbols. Lack of confidence in the police increases the
probability of attacking a political actor and being willing to car-
ry objects to hurt others, while lack of confidence in the justice
system has a significant effect on being willing to attack politi-
cal actors. Male and younger people are more likely to attack
politicians, while younger people are more likely to carry or ap-
prove of carrying objects to hurt others. Neither desire for new
experiences, nor emotions had a significant independent influen -
ce (beyond other variables in the models) in the probability of
engaging in or passively supporting violent activities. 
Finally we examine the determinants of legal political actions,
not usually identified as radical. We check which values moti-
vate mainstream engagement and behaviors, and find that de-
sire for conservation is not as dominant. It explains membership
in non-party organizations and engagement in demonstration
on social issues (also explained by low scores in desire for new
experiences). Ideology is significant but not in a consistent di-
rection. Left-leaning individuals are more likely to be members of
political parties and engage in demonstrations on workers’ rights
and social issues. Right-leaning ideology increases the likeli-
hood of participating in demonstrations on national and religious
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issues. Confidence in institutions also has variable effects. For
membership in parties and non-party organizations, confidence
in the parliament has a positive influence but confidence in the
police has a negative influence. Negative police confidence also
predicts demonstrating on workers’ rights and social issues, as
well as passive support of demonstrations regarding social issues.
Confidence in political parties has a positive effect on participa-
tion and passive support of demonstrations on workers’ rights,
while confidence in justice negatively influences passive support
for membership in political parties. Emotions play some limited
role in predicting legal political action, with hope negatively af-
fecting the probability to be member in non-party organizations,
and anger increasing participation in demonstrations about na-
tional and religious issues. Internal political efficacy increases
membership in non-party organizations, while external political
efficacy increases party membership and decreases active par-
ticipation in demonstrations about national and religious issues.
Being ideologically extreme increases the probability of party
membership, but decreases the probability of participating or
wanting to participate in demonstrations on social and national
or religious issues. Being a woman decreases the probability of
being a member of a political party, while being older positively
influences all legal engagement activities. Education has a posi-
tive influence for almost all types of legal actions. 
Conclusion
In this article we make a conceptual distinction between radi-
calism and reactionismand an operational distinction between tra -
ditional behavioural indicators of these concepts and the more
complex value/tendency/behaviour combination we employ for
their measurement. We start from the premise that radicalism
and reactionism are conceptual neighbours, but differ in the di-
rection of desired change. Whereas radicalism looks forward and
seeks change against the old towards the new, reactionism looks
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backwards and seeks change against the new, towards the old.
Our aim was to untangle radicalism from its left-right characteri -
zations which actually conflate desire for change either forward
or backward, with political ideological preferences. In our ana -
lysis, we examined anomic and violent behaviours in Greece, as
well as legal actions, and used as predictors values that signify
preferences for conservation or new experiences. We found that
actions that fit under the umbrella of ‘new radicalisms’ were trig -
gered by the desire for conservation while being predicted by
left-wing ideology. 
Our findings on the pivotal role of the desire for conserva-
tion in carving citizens’ reactions can be understood in the con-
text of how modernity and tradition have been interrelated in
Greek political culture. Historians, political sociologists and po-
litical analysts have noted Greece’s ‘in-betweenness’ among the
West and the East. Greek culture is described as a transitory one,
with a sort of ‘cultural dualism’ permeating the entire social
fabric. Two distinct cultural forces are described as being at war
since the foundation of the modern Greek state: an introverted
‘underdog culture’ adhering to the ‘tradition’ of the Byzantine
and Ottoman past, and an extrovert culture that ‘draws its intel-
lectual origins from the Enlightenment’ and expresses the secu-
lar demands for modernization (Diamandouros, 1994; Mouzelis
1986). Against the above, Demertzis (1997) argues that the ‘tran -
sition’ thesis is by definition obsolete and that the ‘cultural dua -
lism’ claim is too schematic to grasp the multifaceted cultural
reality of the country. To this end, he introduced the concept of
‘inverted syncretism’ designated to thematize the articulation
rather than the separation of tradition and modernity in Greece.
In comparative political analysis ‘syncretism’ is an acculturation
process where the patterns of one culture are domesticated to
the schemes of another without losing their original function.13
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13. There is family resemblance between inverted syncretism and Clif-
ford Geertz’s idea of the interplay between ‘essentialism’ and ‘epochalism’
in the Third-World nation-building (Geertz 1973). The entrance to political
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In the modernization process of countries like Japan, Taiwan,
and South Korea syncretism occurred because modernizing pat-
terns were assimilated to the traditional ones retaining their ori -
ginal function. In Greece, Demertzis argues, an almost inverted
process takes place: retaining a formal status, modernizing pat-
terns lose their original function while traditional ones remain
intact or even become rejuvenated.
As a long term political cultural trait, inverted syncretism ma -
kes for the linguistic substitution of radicalism with reactionism
in current political discourse in Greece under crisis. Certainly,
inverted syncretism does not explain everything in Greek politics
but it is a strong long-dureè factor that molds much of institu-
tional settings and political behavior of elites and mass public ali -
ke. Under crisis conditions, the values it underpins appear con-
ducive to styles of political action that promote the restoration
of or the sticking to the ‘politics as usual’ that maps directly onto
reactionist political engagement. This hypothesis invites further
exploration with qualitative methodologies and quantitative re -
pli cation with additional and/or alternative datasets. 
Our contribution extends beyond Greece to the broader study
of radicalism. By addingcore values to the conceptualization of ra -
dicalism and reactionism, we hope to untangle these phenomena
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modernity pushes the new nations into the imperatives of contemporary hi -
story and society, as they align with the spirit of the new epoch of develop-
ment, cosmopolitanism and the like. This is what he calls ‘epochalism’. On
the other hand, however, the new nations start their journey into moderni -
zation with nationalisms heavily based on indigenous ways of life and tradi-
tional norms and values. These offer an essential ground of collective and
personal identity, a trend which he calls ‘essentialism’. Faced with socio-eco -
nomic change the population is submerged ‘into a vast confusion of out-
looks’ wherein ‘essentialist and epochalist sentiments are scrambled’ (ibid:
244). The two notions can be deemed functional equivalents of ‘tradition’ and
‘modernity’ or ‘modernization’ and thus the interplay between ‘essentialism’
and ‘epochalism’ resembles the inverted syncretism argument. Yet, what this
misses is the mechanics of the interplay; the ‘vast confusion of outlooks’
that spring from this interplay doesn’t say much about its specification, some -
thing accomplished principally with the concept of ‘inverted syncretism’.
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from each other as well as other – isms and promote empirical
measurement that does justice to their conceptual complexity.
By making a distinction between passive support and actualized
behavior, we seek to unpack the processes that highlight diffe -
rent types of engagement with reactionism and radicalism, and
identify systematic differences in the psychological mechanism
of involvement with these politics of the other kind. We found
consistent evidence of reactionism in behaviors and dormant po -
litical preferences. This means that the switch between supporting
conventional and unconventional political actions often lies at
the level of intentions. If we only study behaviors and ignore in-
tensions, we will not be able to obtain a valid account of radica -
lism or reactionism. Passive support and legitimization through
consent can be a valuable indicator of dormant radical and rea -
ctionary potential. 
The lessons from our research have applications beyond the
study of radicalism. Core values are an important tool for under -
standing political engagement and mobilization beyond tradi-
tional left-right ideological borders. Values related to desire for
conservation can explain engagement with actions that fit the
umbrella of ‘new radicalisms’ as well as legal behaviors which fit
within the context of ordinary political participation. Unsettled
attitudes, emotions, and actions that promote and endorse xe -
nophobia, nationalism, anti-immigration, anti-expert accounts
and anti-establishment sentiments are activated across the We -
stern world and find political incorporations in populist radical
leaders but also mainstream political parties. In this challenging
times, core values will be useful tools for scholars who wish to
shed light to the psychological process by which these tensions
gain traction. We close with an invitation to use core values as
tools to map what brings individuals together in collective ex-
pressions of engagement when traditional party or ideological
divisions seem to set them apart.
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